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Introduction 
Part of the cultural sea-change that has been happening in the western world in 
recent decades is that we are waking up to the dangers of large Idealist 
constructs and doing our best to replace them with smaller-scale explorations 
from the ground up. The larger constructs and their attendant narratives have 
been unmasked as power-plays, and the solution is to tell the smaller stories in 
their own ways and let them speak for themselves in whatever discordant voices 
they choose. This is of course the story of postmodernity in general, visible in 
everything from literary criticism to Brexit-related politics (where the smaller 
regional stories confront the Behemoth of European modernism). And this is I 
think the larger map upon which we can place Matthew Novenson’s remarkable 
new book The Grammar of Messianism, to which I am honoured today to be 
able to respond.1  
I’m not sure whether Novenson would agree, but my provisional judgment is 
that the book represents two different and perhaps sometimes conflicting 
reactions to Idealism. On the one hand there is the linguistic turn which he 
explicitly invokes by citing Wittgenstein and by making the metaphor of 
‘Grammar’ central to the title and to his exposition.2 On the other hand there is 
the turn from Idealism to Realism, to the actual historical study of particular 
movements, people and texts, signalled here by the adjective ‘political’ in the 
subtitle.3 I welcome both and would love to explore things more at this meta-
level, but that may be for another occasion. I haven’t had much time yet to 
ponder the book at leisure; but I have much enjoyed my first two readings of it, 
                                                     
1 Matthew V. Novenson, The Grammar of Messianism: An Ancient Jewish Political Idiom and its Users 
(Oxford: OUP, 2017). References below are to this book unless otherwise noted. 
2 Novenson is aware of the difference between his reception and appropriation of those terms and Wittgenstein’s 
own contexts and concerns; see his comments (11f.) on Dahl’s use of Wittgenstein. 
3 On these shifts, see my remarks in The New Testament and the People of God (= NTPG) (vol. 1 of Christian 
Origins and the Question of God) (London: SPCK, 1992), 96. The shift to the political has been marked in 
recent NT studies, e.g. in Paul, on which see my Paul and the Faithfulness of God (= PFG) (vol 4 of Christian 
Origins and the Question of God), ch. 12. 
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and I look forward to allowing its probing, wide-ranging arguments to influence 
the way I approach many related topics in the future.  
 
The Project and its Virtues 
Novenson aligns himself with, though I think goes significantly beyond, a group 
of recent scholars who have protested against the large-scale history-of-ideas 
construct of ‘messianism’ that used to rule the field, from Scholem and 
Klausner to Mowinckel and beyond.4 Such writers – often cited by Christian 
scholars, myself included, on the assumption that since several of them were 
Jewish one would not be accused of the back-projection of Christian ideas – 
tended to treat ‘messianism’ as a single category of which there were ‘true’ or 
‘pure’ examples to be played off against something which might use the same 
language but which wasn’t really the proper thing, producing the peculiarity 
where each specialisation, Hebrew Bible, second-temple, New Testament, and 
Patristics, assumed that the real thing was somewhere else, leaving only the 
Rabbis to talk unimpeded about the Messiah. The recent writers Novenson cites 
positively include particularly John Collins, Loren Stuckenbruck, Peter Schäfer, 
Gergern Oegma, and – though with more caveats – William Horbury. But his 
wide-ranging study, both of the contexts and grammar of ancient messianism 
and of the arguments and prejudgments of scholarly discussions in the last 200 
years, goes beyond much of this work and includes detailed and welcome 
critique of some particular trends in the discipline.  
I particularly enjoyed the wide range, from Hebrew Bible and ancient ideas of 
‘anointing’ through to the later Rabbis; the attention given to Zerubbabel and 
Herod; and particularly the focus on Bar Kochba and the subsequent puzzled 
reflections on his putative messianic status. Then there is an important 
discussion (245–250) of Justin Martyr and the Dialogue with Trypho; and 
Novenson takes the argument forward into an area most New Testament 
scholars leave to one side, namely the use of messianic language in the world of 
non-orthodox Christianity of the second and third centuries. The book flows 
well as a whole, though there were moments when it felt like a collection of 
detached studies that might have been smoothed out just a little more into a 
single narrative. But among these semi-detached studies are several gems. I 
think particularly of the pair of chapters dealing trenchantly and wisely with two 
                                                     
4 See e.g. G. Scholem, The Messianic Idea in Judaism and Other Essays on Jewish Spirituality (New York: 
Schocken, 1971); J. Klausner, The Messianic Idea in Israel: From its Beginning to the Completion of the 
Mishnah (New York: Macmillan, 1955); S. Mowinckel, He That Cometh: The Messiah Concept in the Old 
Testament and Later Judaism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005 [1956]). 
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important issues, one of recent origin and the other a perennial. The first 
(chapter 5) is the question of a ‘First Messiah’ in Qumran, paving the way as it 
were for Jesus. The second (chapter 6) is the distinction which people have 
often made, and still make in many quarters, between a supposed ‘Jewish 
Messiah’ and a supposed ‘Christian Messiah’. 
With the first of these I think Novenson has made an unanswerable case. The 
idea of a Qumran ‘first Messiah’ is a modern myth. It appears to serve, from a 
different angle, the same agenda as the relativisations of Burton Mack and J. Z. 
Smith (about whom more presently), that is, the attempt to show that early 
Christian beliefs were neither more nor less than a particular instance of a much 
wider general religious phenomenon. But its textual basis, as Novenson has 
shown, will not support this.  
With the second question (the distinction of a putative ‘Jewish Messiah’ and 
‘Christian Messiah’) I fully agree, but I would like to see some more nuancing. 
In particular, I wonder if Novenson has considered the ways in which the 
nineteenth and twentieth century, retrieving a much older ‘Jewish 
Messiah’/‘Christian Messiah’ distinction, newly framed this either/or within the 
eighteenth-century Deist controversies which thought in terms of ‘natural’ and 
‘supernatural’, with the ‘Jewish Messiah’ being seen as ‘natural’ and the 
‘Christian Messiah’ as ‘supernatural’. In both cases, this might then be 
evaluated very differently according to the standpoint. European Christians in 
the Enlightenment period, especially in nineteenth-century Germany with its 
mixture of Lutheran ‘two kingdoms’ theology and Hegelian Idealism, would 
have been eager to make such a distinction, celebrating the supposedly 
‘spiritual’ Christian picture in contrast with the this-worldly and political Jewish 
one. Many Jews, long used to a similar contrast, would naturally reverse the 
evaluation: if these Christians think that salvation is something which does not 
involve the good creation of the One God, they are simply opting for some kind 
of Platonism.  
It is noticeable at this point that the subtitle of Novenson’s book nails a 
particular flag to the mast: this is an ancient Jewish political idiom. I don’t think 
he means this in a narrow sense, and he certainly is not intending to buy into the 
modernist either/or I have just sketched. He would (I think) be the first to insist 
that for ancient and not so ancient Jews the political idiom was heavily freighted 
with theology: in a line going back to clear biblical statements such as Psalm 72 
or Isaiah 11, the restorative justice exercised by the coming King will be the 
means by which the whole world will be filled with the divine glory. But of 
course for most western Christians since the Enlightenment, and specially for 
4 
 
those in the dominant (German) traditions of biblical exegesis, any mention of 
‘religion’ would ipso facto exclude the ‘political’. The debates about the 
meaning of messianism are thus one particular battle-ground where larger issues 
of Jewish and Christian identities have been, and still are, thought through and 
sometimes, alas, fought out. The horrible catastrophe of the twentieth century 
was, in one sense, simply the culmination of many centuries of polemic and 
persecution.  
In addition to these two sets of questions (the ‘first Messiah’ and the ‘Jewish or 
Christian Messiah’), there is a third element to the whole picture which must be 
taken into consideration in current debate. This is the secularist agenda which 
wants all religious claims, especially claims to ‘uniqueness’, reduced to 
sociological function on the one hand (Burton Mack, Jonathan Z. Smith) or 
covert and non-theological political aims on the other (Richard Horsely and 
others).5 Simply to raise the historical question of messianic ideas and hopes is 
thus to plunge into a turbulent and many-sided set of debates. 
The central argument of Novenson’s book is that in all cases, from the fourth 
century BC to the early Middle Ages, and specially in the two centuries either 
side of the time of Jesus, the ‘grammar of messianism’ is bound up with two 
things: scriptural retrieval on the one hand and political navigation on the other. 
The varied messianic movements, in other words, were always aware of the 
need for scriptural support in whatever fashion; but this was always tempered 
by the actual circumstances of the movements and particularly the personalities 
involved. There was easily enough flexibility in the way relevant texts were 
being read to accommodate many different possibilities from Herodians at one 
end of a scale to brigand leaders at the other.6 There was (in other words) no 
‘one-size-must-fit-all’ set of messianic texts. Even the texts that were cited quite 
frequently could be taken in different ways according to the needs, including 
perceived propaganda needs, of the particular moment. Novenson’s central 
thesis at this point looks back to, but to my mind is much more satisfying than, 
Neusner’s earlier protest about ‘Judaisms’, plural, and ‘their Messiahs’. As has 
often been pointed out, for something to have a plural there must be a singular, 
a larger family likeness within which the plurality can be given the attention it 
deserves. 
                                                     
5 See e.g. B. Mack, A Myth of Innocence: Mark and Christian Origins. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1988; J. Z. Smith, 
Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late Antiquity (Chicago: U. 
of Chicago Press, 1994); R. A. Horsley, Jesus and the Spiral of Violence: Popular Jewish Resistance in Roman 
Palestine (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987). 
6 On brigand leaders see e.g. 135–48. One of the fascinating things highlighted by Novenson is the messianic 
ambition of Herod, reflected in later traditions (77–82). 
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A Question of Method and Absent Friends  
At this point I found myself wanting to raise a question of method. Novenson is 
determined to allow the word Christos and its cognates to set the agenda and 
lead the way, in contrast to the older, perhaps Continental and/or Idealist, notion 
of ‘real messianism’ which would include some uses and relegate others to 
‘spurious’ status. I am not sure that he avoids the opposite trap, which is that 
one might apparently shrink the subject to explicit uses of the term Christos, 
thereby screening out those passages where – and one has to be careful how this 
is said – the idea occurs, or might be thought to occur, even though the word 
may not. Of course (hence the need for care) that could be a way of simply 
smuggling in the old Idealist construct by the back door. But it needn’t be. I 
have in mind four or even five themes (depending how we count them) which I 
might have expected to see in a book on Jewish messianism (and on Christian 
messianism seen, rightly, as one branch of that), but which play little or no role 
in this present work. 
The first is the Temple. David plans it, Solomon builds it, the two greatest pre-
exilic kings (Hezekiah and Josiah) reform and restore it, Zerubbabel is supposed 
to build the glorious new Temple, Judas Maccabeus cleanses it, the Herod 
family rebuild and adorn it, the would-be messiahs of the First Revolt focus on 
it, and notoriously Bar-Kochba has a picture of the Temple on one of his coins 
as a statement of intent.7 In the middle of that historical sequence, Jesus of 
Nazareth acts out a Jeremiah-like warning in the Temple; and the subsequent 
exchanges, up to and including the hearing before Caiaphas, have to do 
precisely with the combination of Temple and messiahship. The question ‘what 
are you saying about the Temple?’ is the other side of the coin of ‘are you the 
Messiah?’ The mocking on the cross indicates the same combination of themes: 
So, you are the one who was going to destroy the Temple and build it again in 
three days? We could look at Stephen’s speech to similar effect, and indeed the 
rest of Acts, particularly Paul’s various hearings where the question of Jesus’ 
messiahship and the question of the Temple are intertwined. So: is the Temple, 
and the question of its destruction and rebuilding, not a central part of the 
grammar of messianism? Might it not be ironic that Novenson, in resisting the 
standard nineteenth-century stereotypes, has followed them in implicitly 
(through his choice of method) regarding the Temple as irrelevant? Is this not 
an echo, on the one hand, of a supposedly ‘Christian’ but in fact liberal 
                                                     
7 For the Bar Kochba material see e.g. L. Mildenberg, ‘Bar Kochba Coins and Documents’ in Harvard Studies 
in Classical Philology 84 (1980), 311–35, esp. (325) emphasizing the way in which the rebels superimposed 
symbols of their own hopes over the normal Roman imagery. 
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Protestant account in which the Messiah would be far too spiritual to bother 
with the Temple, and, on the other hand, of a supposedly ‘Jewish’ but in fact 
later Rabbinic account in which the close earlier link between King and Temple 
had long been downplayed? What is more, might a reminder about the Temple 
also highlight the role of an anointed priest along with an anointed king? What 
difference might it make if we were to factor all that into the argument? 
The second point follows closely from this. The rebuilding of the Temple after 
the exile was designed, according to Ezekiel, Zechariah and Malachi, so that 
Israel’s God might return at last in power and glory. The nexus between 
speaking of a Messiah and speaking of Israel’s God fulfilling his long-awaited 
promises, not least the promise of glorious return (with the obvious corollary of 
victory over pagan oppressors and the establishment of God’s people in safety 
and joy) is (it seems to me) both obvious and difficult. From at least the Psalms 
forward, with Isaiah 9, 11, 40–55 and 61, 63 as a special focus, the texts which 
speak of a coming king of deliverer also speak of the return of YHWH to Zion. 
How do these relate? How does the royal throne of David function along with 
the ultimate royal throne of YHWH? According to later tradition, Akiba 
expounded the ‘thrones’ of Daniel 7.9 as ‘one for God, one for David’, leading 
to obvious controversy, not least because he had a metaphorical ‘David’ in 
mind.8 Clearly there was no room in Novenson’s book to bring in Daniel as well 
as everything else! But will we ever get the full grammar of second-temple 
messianism without it? What difference might it have made if we were to 
include it – and, with it, the obviously messianic and Daniel-related vision of 
the eagle and the lion in 4 Ezra 11 and 12? 
The third point is perhaps less obvious but I think just as important. In the 
Psalms and Isaiah the anointed one, however else described, is to be the true 
ruler of the whole world, not just Israel. Psalm 2 – and we hardly know what 
messianism might mean unless Psalm 2 is central to it – appears to universalise 
the Abrahamic promises, to envisage an ‘inheritance’ which will now not be 
one strip of land but the entire world. We should here, echoing a point made 
earlier, include also Psalm 72, which seems to envisage this whole world, now 
under the wise and just rule of the true king, as a great Temple: the Psalm closes 
with the prayer that the divine glory will fill the whole world, doing for the 
cosmos what the divine glory did in the Tabernacle in Exodus 40. How does 
this worldwide messianic rule fit the ‘grammar’ which Novenson is sketching? 
                                                     
8 The classic discussion of this is still A. F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven: Early Rabbinic Reports about 
Christianity and Gnosticism (Leiden: Brill, 1977). For Akiba’s hailing of Bar Kochba see e.g. y Ta`an 68d. 
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And, in particular, does this ‘grammar’ change over time, with the collapse of 
the two revolts and the rise of Rabbinism?  
I have in mind here two points which Novenson hints at but doesn’t develop. 
The first is in Philo, who sees the present Jewish Diaspora as a sign and 
foretaste of God’s rule over the whole world.9 The second is in Josephus: 
Novenson cites the passage in Jewish War Book VI where Josephus says that 
what drove the people into the First Revolt was ‘an oracle in their scriptures’ 
which said that ‘at that time a world ruler would arise from Judaea’.10 I was 
sorry that this was left hanging in the air; I wanted to know which scriptural 
passage Novenson thought Josephus was referring to, and if (as I and others 
have argued) it was Daniel, and particularly chapters 2, 7 and 9 (and granted 
that Josephus’s own interpretation in terms of Vespasian is obviously self-
serving), how all that in turn affected the grammar of messianism at this crucial 
moment. I am particularly struck by the way in which Josephus, expounding 
Daniel as the great prophet who told you not only what was going to happen but 
when – which must be a reference to the 490 years of chapter 9 – carefully 
downplays the denouement of chapter 2, and then equally carefully omits 
chapter 7 altogether. Novenson points out the danger of the Sherlock Holmes 
argument about the dog that didn’t bark in the night, but here I think the non-
barking is deafening. Josephus, as Novenson points out (140–48), is careful not 
to call the various warlords ‘messiahs’, lest his Roman readers suppose that the 
Revolt arose from central Jewish beliefs (which I think it obviously did and I 
think Josephus knows it obviously did). The grammar of Josephus’s silent 
messianism is, I think, very important. 
The fourth point I would have liked to see factored in – and I know how 
frustrating it is, on finishing a substantial book, to be told about all the things 
you missed out – is the social, political and economic teaching of Jesus and his 
first followers. Here I think Novenson missed a trick in the chapter on the 
‘Jewish Messiah’/‘Christian Messiah’ non-distinction. He rightly points out 
(207–13) that in the early Christian teaching on the Parousia many things come 
back in which Jewish critics have said were central to Jewish messianism but 
which they found missing in Christianity. But those things are also there in the 
teaching of Jesus, in the Nazareth Manifesto in Luke 4, in the Sermons on the 
Mount (Matthew 5–7) or the Plain (Luke 6), in the insistence on forgiveness of 
debts and the implied Jubilee theme of ‘seventy times seven’ in Matthew 18. 
These same features re-emerge in the early church as it experiments with 
different ways of sharing property and with the financial imperatives and 
                                                     
9 See e.g. Philo Flacc 45f.; Leg. 281–4; Praem. 94–7, discussed at PFG 120f. 
10 Josephus, War 6.312–15; discussed at e.g. NTPG 312–14, PFG 116f., 130, 293. 
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responsibilities of, for instance, looking after widows (both in Acts 6 and in 1 
Timothy 5). The injunction to ‘remember the poor’ in Galatians 2.10 looks 
much more like what Jews have seen as messianism than what they have seen as 
Christianity. 
But at this point I was surprised, in the substantial chapter 7 on the fate of 
Messiah-christology in the early church, not to find the discussion which it 
seems to me the book invites: of the ways in which the second and subsequent 
centuries retained some aspects of early Christian messianism and rejected 
others. To put it in an aphorism: the problem with the Constantinian settlement 
was that it retained the idea of the worldwide messianic rule but forgot the way 
in which Jesus had redefined the idea of power and rule itself. Hence the great 
divide – to borrow an aphorism from Henry Chadwick’s famous book The Early 
Church – between empire and monasticism, between those who would rule the 
world and those who would renounce it. And hence the different though related 
divide between the political ‘Jewish Messiah’ and the non-political, non-earthly 
supposedly ‘Christian’ one. For Jesus and the first Christians, the kingdom was 
coming on earth as in heaven. By the third century, however, many had 
forgotten the early Jewish meaning of that, with (I think) long-lasting and 
devastating effects. In particular, it led quite quickly to the point at which 
Novenson glances but which I think needs much more developing: where the 
Jewish meaning of Christos was forgotten and where it could be assumed that 
the word meant, fairly straightforwardly, ‘the second person of the Trinity’.  
I suppose this leads to a fifth point: what about the messianic battle? Here again 
there is perhaps the unconscious influence of earlier constructs, ‘Christian’ 
constructs that saw military violence as part of the Jewish messianism which 
was to be rejected, ‘Jewish’ constructs which didn’t want to play into that 
Christian stereotype. But there it is: David defeated Goliath; Hezekiah sees off 
Sennacherib; Josiah dies in battle; Judas Maccabeus defeats Antiochus; Herod 
defeats the Parthians. This is what kings do. For bar-Kochba, defeating the 
Romans and rebuilding the temple were, almost literally, two sides of the same 
coin. In the middle of that picture Paul (Colossians 2.14–15) and John (12.30–
33) both describe Jesus’ death as a messianic victory, though a victory not over 
Rome but over the dark power that stands behind Rome and uses it for its 
purposes. And with this I come to the obvious lacunae: what happened to the 
Titulus on the cross, emphasized by all four evangelists? What happened to 1 
Corinthians 15.20–28? They are all about the strange messianic victory, 
redefined indeed but still very much part of first-century messianic grammar, 
retrieving and remoulding, exactly as Novenson argues all through, some of the 
central scriptural texts and themes. It seems to me that those passages, and the 
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others to which they relate, are a central part of this broad sweep of messianic 
grammar. Might they affect the overall picture, and if so how? In other words, if 
the metaphor of ‘grammar’ leads us to see how a word is regularly used, and 
what it means in relation to those wider contexts, ought not Temple and Battle 
to be central to this project? 
One footnote to this before some broader concluding remarks. Novenson offers 
a fascinating discussion of the way in which the word Chrēstos, with a long ‘e’, 
might have been mistaken for Christos or vice versa, whether accidentally in the 
Suetonius report of riots in Rome or deliberately in some later Christian 
apologetic or exhortation. It occurs to me – and a brief check of commentaries 
indicates that this is not normally explored – that the eleventh chapter of 
Matthew’s gospel might offer an early hint in the same direction. Matthew 
11.2–15 consists of (a) John the Baptist’s question as to whether Jesus is the one 
to come, then (b) Jesus’ answer quoting Isaiah 35 and elsewhere (as in a 
messianic text from Qumran11), and (c) the saying about John being Elijah 
(Matthew 11.14). One might suppose that there was then a change of topic, as 
Jesus denounces the crowds that failed to pay attention and the cities that failed 
to repent. That polemic then gives way to the ‘bolt from the Johannine blue’ in 
11.25–30. But right at the end we may, perhaps, discern a further answer to the 
question of John the Baptist. Take my yoke upon you, says Matthew’s Jesus, 
because I am meek and lowly in heart, and you will find the rest you deeply 
need. Then the final explanation: ho gar zygos mou chrēstos kai to phortion 
mou elaphron estin. ‘My yoke is ‘easy’ or ‘kind’; an odd phrase, with only 
distant echoes. Perhaps it also indicates, for those with ears to hear, that Jesus is 
offering the Messianic yoke, the Messianic Torah? Is this, despite the distance 
of over twenty verses, a coded answer to the question from John the Baptist? 
 
Conclusion 
This new book by Matthew Novenson is one of those works of which reviewers 
will rightly say, ‘All future studies of this subject will have to do business with 
this work’. For that reason it is worth while raising two wider questions. First, 
in thoroughly approving the turn away from the grand abstract formulations of 
an earlier generation and towards grammar on the one hand and history on the 
other, I wonder if Novenson has given thought to the ways in which, once one 
has renounced the pretensions of modernist Idealism, one may and must 
nevertheless offer an account, perhaps a series of overlapping accounts, of the 
                                                     
11 4Q521 (Frag. 2) 2.1, 7f., 11–13; see the discussion in my Jesus and the Victory of God (= JVG) (vol 4 of 
Christian Origins and the Question of God ) (London: SPCK, 1996), 531f. 
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larger worldview of the societies and groups where messianism can be seen. 
Such a worldview would have to include not only the symbols, and the 
symbolic praxis, of temple and battle, but also the narrative within which it 
made sense to think that history might reach a climax, whether catastrophic or 
otherwise, and that this (to put it no more strongly) might involve an ‘anointed’ 
figure. In other words, just because we reject Idealism, that does not commit us 
to a fragmented atomism. Most human beings, especially those who involve 
themselves in public life and aspiration, inhabit an implicit narrative. Some 
ancient Jews, and more or less all the early Christians, made this narrative 
explicit. Grammar involves sentences, and sentences regularly tell stories. 
Nothing in the linguistic turn forbids investigating stories; everything in the 
historical turn encourages it. Back to Josephus: what was the unnamed but 
provocative oracle, and how were they reading it? 
This leads in turn to the anxieties of people like Burton Mack and Jonathan Z. 
Smith, anxieties in particular about Christian claims to ‘uniqueness’. They are 
reacting, of course, to easy-going twentieth-century assumptions of cultural and 
political (as well as religious or spiritual) superiority. But once we take that 
point then we must also, as historians, insist that our modernist perspectives 
tend to lead us astray in relation to first-century grammar and history. It is part 
of the grammar of messianism, I think, that a messiah is not simply like a 
prophet, one among a sequence who might anyway be wrong. To say ‘so-and-so 
is Messiah’ – as Akiba did with bar Kochba – is not simply an interesting 
interpretation of an exciting movement. It is a claim that Israel’s God is at last 
doing, here and now, what Israel (or some within it) had long hoped he would 
do, even if it didn’t look like many had thought (e.g. because bar Kochba wasn’t 
from the house of David). It certainly wasn’t a ‘religious’ claim in the modern 
sense, i.e. that bar Kochba was founding a new or better ‘religion’ to be 
compared with other ‘religions’. That, of course, is how the question is 
regularly put in our own day: for Christians to say ‘Jesus of Nazareth was and is 
Messiah’ is heard and felt to be a claim that Christians possess a ‘superior 
religion’. But in the first century such a claim was not about ‘comparative 
religion’. It was a claim about messianic eschatology. It was a claim about 
Israel’s God, of course; it was also a claim about a renewed or reorganised 
polis, a state of social and political affairs. To turn this kind of proposal into a 
proposal about comparative religion (whether then to embrace a superiority 
agenda or to deconstruct it) might just be the last refuge of the kind of reading 
that Novenson, in this book, is rejecting from start to finish. What matters, as 
his subtitle indicates, is the political idiom. Something is happening; something 
has happened; something – that is – in the reality of actual community and in 
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the ‘grammar’ of its speech; something as a result of which neither community 
nor speech will ever be the same again. 
 
